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J
ustice Ginsburg’s dissent in NFIB v. Sebelius gave the Chief Justice 
a gentle lesson in legal analysis and in the politics of enacting stat-
utes. She gave a more pointed lesson in economics to the colleagues who 
found the Affordable Care Act an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s 
power to regulate commerce among the several states.
  The Chief Justice’s opinion made much of the fact that Congress had 
never previously imposed affirmative obligations on Americans under 
the Commerce Clause. Justice Ginsburg observed that Congress had im-
posed similar obligations under other clauses—a duty to report for jury 
duty, to register for the draft, to buy guns for use in the militia, to turn 
in gold coins for paper currency, and to file a tax return. The Chief Jus-
tice responded that those duties were “based on constitutional provisions 
other than the Commerce Clause.”
  In any law school classroom, an instructor would have responded to 
the Chief Justice, “But, that’s just like saying those cases were different 
because they were decided on Tuesdays.” What he needed to supply was 
a reason for thinking that those other provisions somehow conferred 
greater power on Congress than did the Commerce Clause. One candi-
date reason seems ruled out by general considerations of constitutional 
structure: It would be hard to defend the proposition that those powers 
were somehow “more plenary” than the Commerce Clause.
  Another candidate might seem more promising at first. Straining only 
with respect to the requirement that people surrender their gold coins, 
one might say, as some of the litigants had, that those powers deal with 84
fundamental aspects of citizenship in the United States. Here the dif-
ficulty is subtler, though not much. Those who pursued that argument 
would have to explain why the Court—rather than Congress—was the 
institution entitled to specify what powers implicated fundamental as-
pects of citizenship. The case for lodging that entitlement in Congress is 
reasonably strong, with respect to both the ACA itself and the Commerce 
Clause more broadly. And, in any event, the question raises the general 
questions about the relationship between constitutional review and con-
gressional power that are the bedrock of constitutional law. On those 
questions, the Chief Justice’s response was among the weaker available: 
“Our respect for Congress’s policy judgments thus can never extend so 
far as to disavow restraints on federal power that the Constitution care-
fully constructed.” Well, sure, but the whole point of the litigation was 
to determine what those restraints were.
  Justice Ginsburg was too polite to respond to the Chief Justice’s discus-
sion of other congressionally imposed mandates. She also was astutely 
silent when the Chief Justice addressed her argument with respect to the 
Medicaid extension. According to the Chief Justice, Congress could not 
threaten the states with the withdrawal of large grants when it adopted 
a “new” program. Justice Ginsburg replied that on the majority’s view, 
Congress could achieve the same result by the technique of repealing the 
existing program and reenacting it as part of the new, larger program to 
which the Court objected. The Chief Justice responded not by denying 
the accuracy of her analysis of the doctrine he set out, but by invoking 
political considerations: “Practical constraints would plainly inhibit, if 
not preclude, the Federal Government from repealing the existing pro-
gram and putting every feature of Medicaid on the table for political 
reconsideration.” That depends, though, on timing. It’s hardly clear that 
had Congress known in 009-0 that “repeal and reenact” was the only 
way to expand Medicaid as substantially as it wanted to do as part of a 
comprehensive program of health care insurance reform, it would have 
faced “practical” obstacles to doing so—or, at least, any greater practi-
cal obstacles than it faced over the adoption of the Affordable Care Act. 85
Things had changed as of 0, of course, and the repeal-and-replace 
strategy was unavailable then. But, I wonder why the Chief Justice and 
his colleagues felt themselves entitled to predicate a holding of unconsti-
tutionality on their not obviously correct assessment of practical politics.
  In contrast to her silence on these questions, Justice Ginsburg did 
spend some time on the economics of health insurance, rebuking her 
colleagues for failing to understand elementary economics.
  The joint opinion made much of the fact that young people were re-
quired to purchase an insurance package that covered a standard set of 
conditions, some of which they would never experience. So, they argued, 
young people were subsidizing older ones. When Justice Ginsburg first 
encountered that argument in a question from Justice Alito at the oral 
argument, she could hardly contain herself: “If you’re going to have insur-
ance, that’s how insurance works.” She restated the point in more detail in 
her dissent. Insurance works by lumping people into groups and charging 
each member of the group a fee—the “price” of the insurance—based 
on the risks, here the likely consumption of health care, the group faces. 
There’s nothing “natural” about the groups lumped together for insurance 
purposes: Smokers and nonsmokers face different risks of lung cancer, but 
an insurance package might lump them together by providing everyone 
with coverage against “life-threatening ailments” for the same fee. The 
nonsmokers “subsidize” the smokers, but, as Justice Ginsburg put it, “in 
the fullness of time,” we expect things to even out. The healthy young, 
lumped together with the ailing old, appear to subsidize the latter, but 
eventually the young become old and they get back what they paid earlier, 
and perhaps even more, in the form of the health care they need when old.
  Justice Ginsburg made the point in another way. When you insure 
your house against the risk that it will be destroyed by fire, it’s silly to 
complain that you’re wasting money each year your house doesn’t burn 
down. You’re buying a guarantee that in the event your house does burn 
down, you’ll be able to rebuild it. Similarly with health care insurance. 
The healthy young “are assured that, if they need it, emergency medical 
care will be available, although they cannot afford it.”86
  Then there’s the “broccoli” problem, which the Court’s majority made 
much of. Justice Ginsburg made two points. The Chief Justice offered 
a reasonably sophisticated version of the broccoli argument by tying a 
mandate about broccoli to health problems associated with obesity: Up-
holding the Affordable Care Act on the ground that Congress thought 
that requiring people to purchase health care insurance would eliminate 
the free ride given to those who counted on emergency services and the 
like for health care would, the Chief Justice said, allow Congress to ad-
dress the free ride given obese people, who consume “too much” health 
care, by requiring that they buy broccoli. Justice Ginsburg responded 
sensibly enough that such a requirement would fail minimal standards of 
rationality, which everyone agreed applied to congressional action. The 
core of her point was simple: Requiring people to buy broccoli was dif-
ferent from requiring them to eat it.
  The broccoli problem had a less sophisticated version. Those who raised 
it thought that requiring people to buy health care insurance would im-
ply that Congress could require people to buy broccoli or cars. Justice 
Ginsburg carefully explained why insurance, as a product, differed from 
broccoli or cars, because insurance was affected by moral hazard and ad-
verse selection problems not associated with broccoli or cars. Assume that 
Congress did mandate that the people buy a car every five years. The car’s 
price isn’t affected by the timing of the purchase: The fact that you need 
a car sometime soon, though not so imminently that the seller can milk 
you for all you’re worth, doesn’t lead car sellers to raise their prices (under 
the ordinary circumstances economists assume exist). Again in Justice 
Ginsburg’s words, if someone eventually wants to buy a car, “she will be 
obliged to pay at the counter before receiving the vehicle.”
  Health care insurance is different. Last week you were fine, and the 
price of the health care insurance you could get would be based on the 
group of which you were a member—under the Affordable Care Act, 
your local community as a whole. Today, though, an ambulance takes 
you to the emergency room after you’ve been in a car accident. The “in-
surance” you’d have to buy at that moment is the cost of the health care 87
you’re about to get—a much higher amount. With insurance companies 
required to issue insurance to everyone at the community rate, waiting to 
buy the insurance is a terrific deal.
  There is much more in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in the Affordable 
Care Act. It is a masterful exposition of law and economics, the more so 
because she understood which targets to pick for her most direct analysis, 
and which to leave unaddressed because of their obvious weaknesses. The 
dissent shows us a judge at the height of her powers.